The second Iranian strike on Israeli territory with a barrage of missiles on October 1 marked a major escalation in the ongoing conflict between the two regional powers. Following Israel’s assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in July, and the recent killings of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and General Abbas Nilvoroushan of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in Beirut, Iran launched a major, public and direct attack on Iran. Her arch enemy. Now the Iranian-Israeli conflict threatens to push the entire Middle East to the brink of a full-fledged regional war.
Regardless of whether that war erupts or not, the mutual attacks between Iran and Israel have already created a new regional power equation that will last far beyond this specific confrontation. Seven long-term strategic consequences of the Iran-Israel conflict have become clear.
The second Iranian strike on Israeli territory with a barrage of missiles on October 1 marked a major escalation in the ongoing conflict between the two regional powers. Following Israel’s assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in July, and the recent killings of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and General Abbas Nilvoroushan of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in Beirut, Iran launched a major, public and direct attack on Iran. Her arch enemy. Now the Iranian-Israeli conflict threatens to push the entire Middle East to the brink of a full-fledged regional war.
Regardless of whether that war erupts or not, the mutual attacks between Iran and Israel have already created a new regional power equation that will last far beyond this specific confrontation. Seven long-term strategic consequences of the Iran-Israel conflict have become clear.
First, the basis of Iran’s national security and military strategy is gradually shifting away from reliance on non-state military allies in the region toward a new form of deterrence. This profound transformation can be seen in the replacement of key figures in the Iranian military organization: from General Qasem Soleimani, the former commander of the Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard who was responsible for Iran’s extraterritorial military operation in the region, to General Amir Ali Hajizadeh. Commander of the Air Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. This suggests that Iran’s gray zone strategy, which prioritized indirect conflict between non-state allies, including Hamas and Hezbollah, is now a complementary approach.
Second, Iran has also abandoned its position of “strategic patience.” Since the end of the bloody eight-year war with Iraq, Iranian military leaders have adopted a secret strategy of absorbing intense pain and retaliating at a time of their choosing. However, decades of sustained Israeli subversion on Iranian soil have reduced Iran’s level of “strategic ambiguity” to what has come to be known as passive strategic patience, characterized by a lack of retaliatory action. Despite its apparent reluctance to make bold domestic policy decisions, Iran has now abandoned its strategic patience for the second time. It concluded, after intense pressure from influential supporters and broader public opinion within the country, that failure to retaliate would represent a strategic turning point.
Third, Iran has now established a clearly defined policy on deterrence. The IRGC’s violent retaliation demonstrated Iran’s will and ability to carry out a devastating attack on Israel. In contrast to the first strike in April, in which most of the Iranian missiles and drones were intercepted, the second missile strike proved to be more successful, penetrating advanced Israeli defense systems. Although Israel has one of the most defended airspaces in the world, and is equipped with the latest anti-missile technology, several Iranian missiles were able to hit major airports in Israel. This highlights the centrality of missile power in Iran’s national security strategy, reinforcing that its missile capabilities are likely to remain non-negotiable in future talks with the West. Tehran may now be more motivated to enhance its military capabilities, which may include deploying Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jets, purchasing Russian-made anti-missile defense systems, and expanding military cooperation with Moscow.
Fourth, Iran’s new red line towards Israel has also been determined. For nearly 15 years, Tel Aviv has launched devastating strikes on Iranian military bases in Syria, even directly targeting top Iranian generals. However, the Israeli bombing of the Iranian consulate in Damascus in early April crossed a critical threshold, prompting Iran to respond to Israel with a barrage of less advanced missiles and drones two weeks later. This was a collapse of Iran’s traditional red lines with Israel. In response to ongoing Israeli actions, including the assassination of a Hamas leader in Tehran and the Hezbollah assassination in Beirut, Iranian retaliation was aimed at re-establishing a level of deterrence. The next time, Iran crossed two important red lines: striking Israeli territory from its territory and targeting a nuclear-armed state. Interestingly, Iran struck the territory of another nuclear power, Pakistan, less than ten months ago. Tehran’s message was clear: the inviolability of its territory is a fundamental red line for both the government and society, even if it cannot fully protect its military bases in the Levant from Israeli air strikes. With no established red line to contain the Iranian-Israeli rivalry, the two sides are likely to seek to redraw the borders by continuing to exchange blows, especially in the run-up to the US presidential elections this year.
Fifth, it seems that Iran’s influence on the Arab street has increased. The soft power gains resulting from this latest attack may restore Iran’s popularity in the Muslim world, which has been tarnished by Tehran’s unwavering support for the Assad regime in Syria. Since the war with Hamas in Gaza, Iranian support among Palestinians and Arab communities has increased significantly. Masoud Pezeshkian’s victory in the recent Iranian presidential election, coupled with a strong voice for regional cooperation led by Vice President for Strategic Affairs Mohammad Javad Zarif and Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi, may help reduce tensions between Tehran and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf. . However, Iran still lacks a strong regional initiative and may face challenges in taking full advantage of this opportunity and translating this influence into tangible shifts in the regional power ranking.
Sixth, Israeli retaliation against Iran could lead to a radical shift in Tehran’s nuclear policy. There are strong voices in Iran, mostly from the hard-line camp, calling for the pursuit of nuclear energy as a strategic means of restoring the country’s full deterrent power. These supporters claim that the most effective tool used by Iran to deter Israeli aggression lies in its strategic decision to fully develop nuclear weapons. The logic behind this argument could gain significant momentum in the wake of any potential Israeli retaliatory attack on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. As a result, the possibility of an Israeli military strike could accelerate Tehran’s pursuit of nuclear energy. The West’s obsession with Iran’s complete disarmament, combined with giving Israel a blank check to pressure Iran’s non-state allies in the Levant, and even in Iranian territory, may lead to an unintended outcome: a nuclear-armed Iran.
Seventh, this conflict highlights the clash between technological power and geopolitical power. While Iran benefits from significant geopolitical advantages, Israel’s weakness lies in its geopolitical weakness, as it is confined to a small area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. This geopolitical difference has shaped their strategies, with Iran preferring operations in the gray zone supported by its network of non-state allies, while Israel relies on a first shock and preemptive strike strategy rooted in technological superiority. Although technology plays an increasingly important role in military revolutions, geopolitical factors remain essential in shaping the course of regional rivalries. Technology erodes the weight of enduring geopolitical realities, but it can never erase them completely.
In this sense, the escalating conflict between Iran and Israel also challenges simplistic narratives about the “end of the Middle East” in American foreign policy. In a broader context, the fate of Washington’s major rivalries in the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic regions is increasingly shifting towards the Arab Gulf and Levant axis, as Tehran works to strengthen its relations with Moscow and Beijing. This dynamic is reviving the geopolitics of the Middle East. The Iranian-Israeli conflict is one of its early manifestations, but it is also far from the final chapter.
